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pality. That Plaintiff's ownership of said abutting property
includes the streets tpemselves, subject only to the use thereof
by the public for highway purposes. The abutting property
had been subdivided into building lots ..
The Defendant municipal corporation, without obtaining
the consent of Plaintiff, laid and constructed a 48-inch steelreinforced concrete water pipe line along and under the surface
of said streets, for the purpose of conducting water to Salt
Lake City, for the domestic and industrial users in said City;
that the property abutting said streets was in no way served or
benefitted by the said water pipe line.
Plaintiff then.· alleged consequential damages resulting
from Defendant's unlawful appropriation of, and trespass upon
Plaintiff's property, followed by a prayer for a decree requiring
Defendant to remove said line, to.enjoin Defendant from laying
any line through said street, and for damages and costs. (R.

PP· 1, 2.)
Defendant's motion to dismiss upon the grounds the
complaint failed to state a cause of action was granted. (R.
pp. 5, 6.)
Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint with substantially the same allegations as contained in the original complaint, as set out above; there was added, however, allegations
that Plaintiff, because said water pipe line was laid in said
streets, would be required to lay duplicate water and sewer
lines to serve said property, and that duplicate gas lines would
also be required, and that as a further result of said water pipe
line, the development of said property as a residential sub4
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division would be materially retarded. The prayer for damages was the same as contained in the original complaint. _(R.

PP· 7, 8).
Defendant's motion to dismiss the amended complaint
for the same reason as for the dismissal of the original complaint was granted (R. p. 11). From· this judgme~t of dismissal, Plaintiff appeals.
The sole question to be determined in this appeal, is
whether Plaintiff, either in the original or in the amended complant, has stated a cause of action upon which relief should
be granted.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
Ownership of property abuttit;1g both sides of a street
includes ownership of the street itself, subject only to the use
of the same by the public for highway purposes.

POINT II
The unauthorized laying_ of a water pipe line by a municipality in a street outside of its corporate limits, which line
in no way benefits or serves the abutting property, is an additional burden upon the property, constituting an invasion of
the abutting O\vner' s rights, and is actionable.

5
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY ABUTTING BOTH
SIDES OF A STREET INCLUDES OWNERSHIP OF THE
STREET ITSELF, SUBJECT ONLY TO THE USE OF THE
SAME BY THE PUBLIC FOR HIGHWAY PURPOSES.

Appellant, in the original and amended complaints, alleged ownership of property abutting both sides of the streets
in question, and a property interest in the street itself. Appellant contends that this interest is the ownership of the fee,
subject to the public's use thereof for highway purposes. Our
statutes, and cases decided thereunder, are very clear on these
points.
Section 36·1-1, Utah Code Annotated 1943, reads as follows:
"In all counties all roads, streets, alleys, lanes, courts,
places, trails and bridges laid out or erected as such
by the public, or dedicated or abandoned to the public,
or made such in actions for the partition of real property, are public highways."
In Section 36·1· 7, Utah Code Annotated 1943, we find
the following:
"By taking or accepting land for a highway the

public acquires only the right of way and incidents
necessary to enjoying ahd maintaining it. A transfer
of land bounded by a highway passes .the title of the
person whose estate is transferred to the middle of the
highway."
6
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It is clear from these two sections of the Statutes, that the
streets in question are categorically classified as ((highways,"
and that the Plaintiff, in owning the abutting property, owns
to the center of the highway, subject only to the right of the
public in the same as a right of way.
The Respondent relied upon Section 78-5-4, Utah Code
Annotated 1943, contending that the County of Salt Lake
O\vned the streets in question, and it was upon this statute· that
the District Court granted the order of dismissal of the original
(Omplaint.
Section 78-5-4 has the following provisions:
C(Such maps and plats, when made, acknowledged,
filed and recorded, shall operate as a dedication of all
such streets, alleys and other public places, and shall
vest the fee of such parcels of land as are therein expressed, named or intended for public uses in such
county, city or town for the public for the uses therein
nanv~d or intended.''
However, Sowadzki vs. Salt Lake County, 104 Pac. 111,
at page 116, construed Chapter 50, Laws of 1890, page 76, which
is the forerunner of Section 78-5-4 quoted above, and which is
substantially the· same in wording, and identical in ~earring.
In the S~wadzki case, our Supreme Court said:
. cc\X'hile the word cfee' is used in 'the section, it js
clear from what follows that it was not intended that
the fee of the corpus or land itself .should pass, but
only the fee to the -surface, and this only for public
use for all purposes of a street or highway. The fee
mentioned in the statute was thus what is known as
7
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a Jani ted or determinable fee, and was created for a
special purpose or purposes only, and hence was subject of abandonment."
Thus, from the foregoing Sections of our code and the
Sowadzki case, it must be concluded that neithe~ the public
nor the County of Salt Lake owned the fee interest in the
corpus of the streets described in the complaint. The fee
title belongs to the abutting owner. In fact, the County owns
nothing. Only a right of use exists in the public for highway
purposes. Consequently, the Appellant in the instant case
has a property interest in the street which is subject to an invasion or damage.

POINT II
THE UNAUTHORIZED LAYING OF A WATER
PIPE LINE BY A MUNICIPALITY IN A STREET OUTSIDE OF ITS CORPORATE ~IMITS, WHICH LINE IN NO
WAY BENEFITS OR SERVES THE ABUTTING PROPERTY, IS AN ADDITIONAL BURDEN UPON THE PROP. ERTY, CONSTITUTING AN INVASION OF THE ABUTTING OWNER'S RIGHTS, AND IS ACTIONABLE.
We are next concerned with whether there is alleged an
invasion of Appellant's property .interest in the street, which
is actionable.
In the original and amended complaints, Appellant alleged that the unauthorized laying of the water pipe line in
the street was a trespass. In the amended complaint, there
8
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\vas an allegation also that the use of the street by the Respondent in such· a way as to interfere with the normal use
thereof by Appellant in servicing his own property, was an
invasion of Appellant's property rights in and to the street.
Tiffany on Real Property, 3rd Edition, Vol. 3, paragraph
926, under the subject of Additional Servitudes, at pages 603-04
has this to say:
The use of a street or highway for sewers,
gas pipes, or water pipes, is a legitimate use, for which
the owner of the fee cannot recover compensation,
unless it is not for the benefit of the community itself,
or the rnembers thereof, but is for the benefit :of another·
municipality, or of individuals alone . .. "(Italics ours.)
H

•

•

•

This pr-inciple as contained in Tiffany, which appears to be
universal, is supported by many cases. Some of them refer
to the laying of gas mains; others, sewers; and still others,
water mains, such as concern us in the instant case.
The court was concerned with the laying of a gas line
in a county highway, outside the municipality thereby served,
in Sterling's Appeal, 2 Atl. 105, a Pennsyl:vania case. The
court said:
ccln Bloomfield and Rochester Natural Gas-Light Co.
vs. Calkins, 62 N.Y. 386, it was held that a corporation
organized under an act similar to ours, authorizing
formation of gas-light companies, has no authority to
lay its pipes in a country highway without the consent
of, or without the appraisal and payn1ent of c_ompensation to, the owner of the land. There is no reason :why
this should not be the rule with respect to public roads
in the rural districts.''
9
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In Kincaid vs~ -Indianapolis Natural Gas Co. (Indiana),
24 N. E. 1066, the Gas Company laid mains in a highway outside of the municipality to be served. The court said:
~

The appropriation of the land for a rural highway did not entitle the local officers to use it for any
other highway purposes, although they did acquire a
right to use. it for all purposes legitimately connected
with the local system of highways. A use for any
other than a legitimate highway purpose is a taking
within the meaning of the Constitution, inasmuch as
it imposes an additional burden upon the land, and
whenever land is subjected to an additional burden
the owner is entitled to compensation. The authorities,
~!thought not very numerous, are harmonious upon the
question that laying gas-pipes in a suburban road is
the imposition of an additional burden, and that.
compensation must be made . . . "
cc ••

Several cases are cited in this case in support of the legal
principle.
The Ward vs. Triple State Natural Gas & Oil Co. case,
74 S. W. 709, decided by the Kentucky Supreme Court, presented a similar situation. The Kentucky Supreme Court handed
down the same ruling as the Kincaid case, citing it as an
authority for so doing.
The problem of a municipality laying a line (this time
a sewer line) in a street outside the corporate limits of the
city thereby served, was involved in the case of Yan Brunt,
et. al., vs. Town of Flatbush, et. al., 27 N. E. 973, a New York
case.
In this case, the Town of Flatbush constructed a sewer
10
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line to discharge sewer into the ocean, and in so doing, laid
the line over and through a street in a sparsely-populated section of Flatlands, another community. Inasmuch as there
was only an easement over the street in the public, the court
held that the Town of Flatbush must condemn and pay for the
land, saying:
~'The

sewer belongs exclusively to the Town of Flatbush, and is solely for the benefit of the inhabitants
thereof. Under such circumstances, what right have the
commissioners to enter upon the lands of the Plaintiffs
and dig up their soil and place sewers therein without
· their consent and without compensation to them? We
can perceive none, and we know of no principle of law
and of no authority which can justify them . . . '' .
In the case at bar, the City of Salt Lake is attempting to use
the land of the Plaintiff to lay a water pipe line, in which the
public only has an easement for highway purposes, which line
is "solely for the benefit of the inhabitants" of Salt Lake City.
Applying the principle of the foregoing case, this cannot be
done without securing the consent of, and compensating the
Plaintiff.
One of the questions which came up in Rouse vs. Kinston, .
123 S. E. 482, a North Carolina case, was whether an abutting
owner to a highway outside the limits of a municipality, was
entitled to compensation for the laying of a water main under
the surface of the highway by the municipality. The court,
stating that the abutting owner held the fee interest, on page
486, had this to say:
"In the present case, the defendant denies the right
of Plaintiff to recover damages for the pipe line run11
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ning along the state highway No. 10, plaintiff having
a fee simple title to the land. In Teeter v. Postal Teleg.Cable Co., 172 N. C. 785, 90 S. E. 941, it is said: 'It
is not denied by defendant that the telegraph line
superimposed upon a railroad right of way is· an additional burden which entitled the owner to compensation. Hodges v. Western U. Teleg. Co., 133 N. C. 225,
45 S. E. 572; Phillips v. Postal Teleg.-Cable Co., 130
N. C. 513, 89 Am. St. Rep. 868, 41 S. E. 1022'.
"To the same effect is a \Vater main."
In Hofius vs. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., ( 1946) 146
Ohio St. 574, 67 NE (2) 429, we have a case which is identical
with the one at bar. In the Hofius case, there was an attempt
to construct a water main in a highway outside a municipality
by a village for the benefit of domestic and industrial users
of the village.
· The court held that the public's interest tn a highway
outside the municipality is an easement for the purpose of
public travel, with the fee remaining in the abutting landowner. Then the court had this to say in the syllabus, which
was borne out in the opinion itself:
"The construction of a water main in a highway
outside a municipality by a village for the benefit of
domestic and industrial water users of the village constitutes an additional burden upon the fee of the abut- ·
ting owner."
Numerous cases .are cited in the Hofius case in support of
the doctrine therein accepted.
Counsel for Appellant has checked each of the foregoing
cases in Shepard's Citator, and not one of them ha~ been overruled or modified by a later decision.
12
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CONCLUSION
In view of the foregoing; there can be but one conclusion.
The Plaintiff, having alleged in his complaint that he, as the
abutting owner, is the owner of the fee of the streets in question, subject only to the right of way in the public for highway
purposes, and the laying of the water pipe line therein by Salt
Lake City, the Respondent, without first having obtained the
consent of the Plaintiff owner, has set forth, both in the original
and amended complaints, a cause of action.
Thus, Appellant urges this Honorable court to reverse the
judgment of the trial court dismissing the original and amended
complaints, with instructions to the trial court to require Respondent to file its answer thereto, and to proceed to hear the
matter on its merits.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM D. CALLISTER
and A. C. MELVILLE,
Attorneys for Appellant
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